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Financial Markets
Auction Market Value Theory
Donald L. Jones
November 22, 2005
CISCO Futures©
Introduction
Financial markets are the grease that lubricates national and international
commerce. These markets are in a continuous state of price discovery, and it
will be shown, of value discovery. Included are stock and options markets,
commodities, bonds, forex and a wide variety of derivatives.
All have a general commonality; they are openly traded and reported,
price is set by auction and they must follow government and industry rules.
Markets that meet these conditions are termed auction markets. The
primary data generated by auction markets are their transactions, or ticks
and sometimes, other items such as volume of trade and bid/ask. The subject
of this work is auction market analysis from the standpoint of value, or
Auction Market Value Theory.
Auction markets generate the world's largest money flows. Yet, their basic
structure, the internals of how they work and what drives them, are not
well understood. In the first section we briefly view trader's involvement
with markets and approaches to market understanding.
In passing it is noted that most traders do
not "beat the market" and this includes possibly the two largest groups:
public (noise) traders and the managers of mutual funds (insiders).
Section 2
examines the recent findings of the econophysicists. They have determined that
auction markets are complex, self organizing and driven by feedback.
This finding lies at the root of auction market value theory. We will find
that the market's feedback becomes the principal arbiter, the limiter of how
theory can be applied.
Section 3 addresses the types of analyses that the basic market structure
(complex, self organizing and driven by feedback) can consider. These
proposed practices may be permitted or not. The ability to evaluate
a practice at the market structure level is new and a potentially powerful
advance for all traders and risk takers.
It is likely that the largest trading loss in history (5) was based on a
practice that would not have been permitted.
Feedback is the data track of the market. In Section 4, we will address it
from the
standpoint of market discoveries; methodologies that allow the decoding of
feedback. Feedback, the market's continuing message, guides
trading. We cover: 1) The path of auction market value theory anlaysis and
the three major discoveries, detailed in Appendix 1; 2) Basic market
analysis that applies the concepts of feedback, day value and market
condition (multi-day value); and, 3) A set of axioms and observations forming
the basic principles of auction market value theory.
Section 1
Psychology, Predictions, Market Analyses
People feel the need to know why an individual market did
what it did and they want to know what it will do next.
Further, they want to know what the collective market will do and how far
it will go (the big picture). There is a demand for this information
and particularly in the case of equities, the marketplace (read brokerage
firms and independent market pundits) will oblige. In general, a scientific
study will attempt to ignore or minimize the biases and/or beliefs of
the experimenter. With market analysis and auction market trading, biases
of the traders can, at times, dominate market activity. Psychology is a very
real factor in markets.
Most analysts predict market movement on the
basis of a few factors. Sometimes they are right, sometimes wrong.
Sometimes their market calls are colored by their firm's other needs.
Correct predictions are selectively remembered. Consistently correct
predictions are rarely if ever seen. Even single market factors such
as interest rates are difficult to predict with even fifty percent success
over so short a period as six months (10, p18).
While it is human nature to want to know the future, correctly predicting
markets could be very profitable. Guides to trading are advertised in many
trade journals, some with claims of large successes. What is being sold is
often a simple methodology that can be of some limited value to a new
trader. The excessive claims are the bait. Auction Market Value Theory (AMVT)
does not predict the future direction of any market. This will be shown to
derive directly from theory in the Practices section. What AMVT does
offer is an
understanding of the current market situation or phase (balance, trend). And
it does offer a marker (value) that indicates change as it begins.
History of Market Prediction
There is a powerful impetus for one class of trader to predict market behavior,
i.e. managers of mutual funds. Fund managers are judged by whether their fund
prospers or not. Records are kept by numerous outside sources.
In the history of equities only a few
practitioners have consistently beaten the market (Templeton comes to mind).
The standard of comparison is a moving target, a market index. A fund manager
may lose 20 percent of
fund equity and still be perceived a winner because the index lost more.
Equities funds have the advantage of being net long in a long term upward
environment. Traders in hedge funds, commodities, indices, forex, options
and the like can as easily trade the downside as the up. Here, winning is clear
and absolute. Again, acceptable results over a multi-year timeframe are scarce.
Some hedge funds have done very well, indeed; some have lost excessively. It
is hard to calculate a net figure because of lack of reporting.
It is well known in the high-leverage arena of futures
that 90 to 95 percent of new traders lose. In equities, short term trading
may fare even worse, although few reliable statistics are available. The final
analysis is that most reported trading classes lose and any predictive behavior
did not save them. Further, the vast amount of money in mutual funds argues
that that class of trader will uncover successful predictive methods, if such
exist.
In view
of the highly competetive nature of the fund business,
it is fair to believe that fund managers use the best information available
and the best possible management techniques. The search is always on for
the better method. The question has always been "where can I find that
better method?". We posit the answer is that that elusive "better method"
lies in an understanding of the basics of market behavior, i.e. the better
method starts with undestanding market value.
Market Models
Value and Economic Fundamentalism
Possibly the earliest analytical approach to stock valuation is the work of
Graham and Dodd, which seeks to find value from the discounted return on
dividends.
This fundamentalist approach can include other variables as well, such
as the U.S. government economic reports, other government reports, etc..
As time passed it became understood that emotions played a role in investment
decisions and should, in some way, be included. Also,
discounting the dividends required a forecast of interest rates. In the
modern world, that turns out to be difficult indeed (10, p18). More generally
economic fundamentalists study market/economic variables and try to fit
the pieces together, in an implicitly linear way; to find value. We would
call this "true value" since it is what the asset is "really worth", something
akin to the Graham & Dodd discounted dividends value.
With true value in hand, successful fund growth would be assured by seeking out
undervalued assets. Again, success is elusive.
Mathematical Fundamentalism
A mathematical fundamentalist goes a step past economic fundamentalism in
that an attempt is made to not only identify the variables, but to
mathematically catalog their
inter-relationships. In most cases there are so many variables it is
virtually impossible to know the inter-dependences. So the analysis
is confined to a few 'major' variables. Even with less than a dozen variables,
the mathematical description of the market would be a daunting,
non linear, non homogeneous differential equation with non-constant
coefficients. Interestingly, such an equation has the possibility of
solution in the limit of a very quiet market. In that case, graphs of
market variables will give straight lines (e.g. price versus weeks without
rain for soybeans in their growing period). Capital Market Theory (1)
has had some success in the 'quiet markets' by assuming a market distribution
function. Unfortunately, it is not
the quiet markets in which the risk and potential return is significant.
A general differential
equation of the market is impossible to solve in closed form because the
many variables are impossible to catalog along with their various interactions.
Technical Analysis
Technical analysis is the graphing of market data and reading the charts
for recurring patterns (e.g. a head and shoulders formation). It also
includes mathematical manipulation of market data via moving averages,
oscillators, etc. A more arcane part of the field reads
significance into fibonacci series, elliott waves (cycle analysis, 11) and even
astrological data. Typically, one calculates or reads the graph to get
"indicators" of market direction or intent. Since most of the charts can be
computer
drawn and the indicators can be listed, the user receives a trading path
to follow. Unfortunately, the path is not well defined since the indicators
give varied and often conflicting results.
These methods are available at reasonable cost from a number
of sources. There are hundreds of books on technical analysis. Most new
traders begin with access
to technical analysis. Does it work? Probably not if the standard is trading
sucess: the vast majority of new practitioners fail and the vast majority
of current users (e.g. fund managers) do not break even relative to the applicable
market index.
Current Market Theory, CAPM
Capital Market Theory (CAPM) has been in place at least since 1970 (1).
The primary assumptions are that the market is stochastic and participants
(investors) behave rationally.
CAPM has been under attack almost since inception by
behaviorial economists for some of it's assumptions (2). More recently,
CAPM's reliance on the assumed gaussian distribution has come under possibly
fatal attack by econophysicists (2, 3), who show conclusively
that the assumed gaussian distribution can wildly underestimate risk. Further,
they find that no known distribution function that can fit the market data.
The assumption of stochasticity, i.e. the bell shaped curve, is a huge
convenience for (CAPM) market analysis and can lead
to elegant mathematical solutions, such as the Black Scholes option
valuation formula. Unfortunately, it appears the the market is stochastic
only so long as the risk is limited; those periods when the market is moving
along on an even keel. When a market enters the non-gaussian phase (end of
a bubble, dire economic news, etc.) risk may shoot up exponentially. In October
1987 the Dow Jones Index dropped over 30 percent in four days (Oct 14 - 19),
a virtual impossibility in a stochastic market (one chance in 10 power 23
years, or longer than the world has existed (2)). More recently, the
failure of
Long Term Capital Markets to the tune of $1.3 trillion is laid, at least
partially, to using a modified Black Scholes formulation to trade
options (5).
Putting it all Together
A competent market analyst would be expected to be familiar with at least all
four methodologies (economic and mathematical fundamentalism, technical
analysis and CAPM).
In the case of an equities fund manager, for example, it is assumed that
the absolute best effort is exerted, since the survival of the enterprise
is based on performance. Yet, it is a fact that actively traded funds do
not do as well as index funds. Or, fund managers, on average, cannot even
do as well as index funds. The statistics for futures traders seems
to be reliable, with 90 to 95 percent of new traders failing,
and is just as dismal.
Options trading (Black Scholes) falls into line with the others,
with the added onus of generating larger losses than any other method.
Methods and Results
Why are markets so hard to trade profitably? One would assume that as
in any business there are capable practitioners and those who are not
so good. Except for expenses, a trade should have a 50 - 50 chance of
winning. Considering all the poorly qualified equities traders, one would
expect the professionals, e.g. the fund managers, to win consistently against
such under-qualified competetion. They do not appear to.
Possibly the wrong question is being asked. It may be the methodology.
If a bridge fails, it asked "what was left out of the design". In the
famous Tacoma Narrows bridge disaster it turned out that torsional shear
(twisting) was omitted from the analysis and the bridge failed.
It may be that fund managers and other traders are using the best information
they have,
but something is missing from their formulation. Could it be that their model
is defective? Are they acting on theory rather than observation?
Probably the most used model in portfolio management is CAPM. But CAPM expects
a high level of professionalism from the average investor, a level not found
by empirical economists. Too, the assumed stochastic, gaussian formulation is
proved wrong by the econophysicists. Possibly, CAPM offers too much and that
on a shaky foundation. Why is CAPM still pre-eminent in MBA studies:?
In spite of the substantial and known drawbacks with CAPM, the theory
continues to be taught in financial MBA programs. This is probably a
result of there being no logical successor theory and CAPM is teachable.
By "teachable" we mean:
1. It is coherent and complete
2. Mathematics are sophisticated enough to make MBA level students
work on the mechanics.
3. Tests can be made exact and thus easily gradeable.
4. The general ideas can give students a grasp of capital markets.
5. MBA students who are not planning to be traders (the majority).
thus have enough information to get by.
6. Portfolio balancing/efficient frontier and other portfolio
concepts are impressive and useful.
7. Mathematically oriented students can manipulate CAPM to gain
new uses, e.g. Black Scholes option pricing
A more prudent
approach could be to start from first principles and understand the market
itself before projecting solutions. In such a scientific, empirical approach,
market understanding is placed on a firm, testable foundation and inferences
can then be drawn from the behavior of the market variables. Whatever is
found can then be traced back to first principles. That is the track of Auction
Market Value Theory (AMVT). It is observational. Nothing is expected beyond
the market's data. The data is complex since it is reporting a complex
market. AMVT proposes to unravel, or at least live with, the complexity.
Section 2
Mathematical Auction Market Description: Econophysics
Econophysics groups are attempting
to understand risk, to explain extreme events like crashes and basically
to explain why markets behave as they do. Like CAPM, econophysics takes as
observables, price and return (price change).
Modern Market Analysis, Complex Systems and Econophysics
Recent work by Johnson, Jeffries and Hui (3) (JJH) in the emerging field of
Econophysics treats the financial markets as complex systems. They
consider the problems of:
1) Markets as complicated dynamical systems that are
continually
generating high-frequency data series.
2) How the stochastic assumption gives misleading
answers to practical
problems such as minimizing risk, explaining extreme
events such as
drawdowns and crashes and pricing derivatives.
3) Why financial markets behave as they do.
4) What can be done to minimize risk.
JJH on page 2, lists as goals, these practical questions:
1) When to buy.
2) When to sell.
3) Risk.
4) Predictability.
5) Crowd behavior.
6) Forecasting on basis of crowd behavior.
7) Forecasting time evolution of markets.
Although numbers 1 - 7 do scope the needs of traders, there is little in the
book resolving the questions. This is not surprising. A trader with straight-
forward answers to all seven could have untold riches. In all probability
the very good traders of the world do have a good feel for the desired seven.
In Section 3 on permitted practices, prediction is not-permitted. Still,
a trader who masters items 1, 2, 3 and 5 is on the road to success.
Complex systems concepts have only recently begun to be applied to
financial market analysis. Complex systems are generally nonlinear with
feedback acting to continually adjust the system. There appears to be
no hard and fast definition of a complex system.
Peters in 1999 (28) listed these characteristics of a complex financial
system:
1) The system has a purpose (e.g. to facilitate trading of say, soybean
futures, stock market indexes, etc.)
2) The system is decentralized (many independent agents/traders)
3) Feedback occurs within the system (all agents observe the system
and make changes in their behavior)
4) The system adapts to information from feedback (losers get out, winners
increase holdings)
5) Adaptations are decentralized leading to innovation (each agent makes
its own decisions)
6) Rules govern the system, rules can change or be changed (adapt)
e.g. the movement from exchange floor to computer trading
Observations 1 - 6 describe auction markets such as stocks, interest rates,
futures, derivatives and actually even markets as diverse as food and
department stores (7). The financial markets are double sided auctions
where a buyer at one moment may become a seller the next moment.
Items 2 - 5 show that feedback is diverse, affecting each agent
or trader in a unique, personal way. The net effect of the feedback
manifests itself in macrosocpic market parameters such as price movement
and volume. But it is impossible and not even desirable to isolate a
particular feedback element from any one of the agents; the useful
observable is the net market change related to that element.
JJH defines complexity in financial markets somewhat differently from Peters.
1) Feedback: change contains an element of remembering.
2) Non-stationarity: the statistical distribution changes.
3) Many agents: traders, institutions interact in time-dependent ways.
4) Adaptation: agents adapt their behavior to improve their chances.
5) Evolution: agents behavior evolves thru feedback and adaptation and the
system may not be in equilibrium. It can exhibit extreme behavior
such as crashes.
6) Single realization: i.e. averages over time are not equal to averages
over ensembles.
7) The market is an open system coupled to the environment: one cannot
discriminate between exogenous (outside) and endogenous (inside)
influences.
JJH's analysis turns on measurement of price and return (3, p16).
Briefly, they assume:
1) Price as a function of time is the primary observable.
2) The assumptions of CAPM that price changes are independent and
identically distributed are not borne out by observation.
3) CAPM volatility is not sufficient to classify risk.
4) A market price series' expected value depends in part on previous
movement, the market has some memory. This helps explain drawdowns
and crashes.
5) Crowd action plays a role in volatility.
6) The 'zero risk' in writing options under CAPM assumptions is not true in
real markets.
7) Real price series differ from the random-walk model.
8) Trader's beliefs/actions can create patterns sometimes leading to
crashes.
9) Markets are non-linear.
10) Internally and at all times, price moves much more and faster than
rational expectations (of return) would predict.
The point is that both econophysists and Peters see the
markets as complex systems with feedback causing change dynamically.
The econophysicists are more mathematically oriented and
propose a stricter analysis. They also propose a mode of attack,
one using distribution functions. At this point it is not clear how
a general market distribution function might be developed. Looking at the
complex market from a differential equation standpoint, a descriptive
equation would likely be nonlinear (feedback probably does not behave
linearly), non-homogenous (variables most likely could not be separated,
even if they could be defined)
and the coefficients are non-constant (an increase of ten percent in
the soybean crop would rarely translate exactly into a change in price
of ten percent). It would be most unlikely that a complicated differential
equation could be translated into a distribution function. One might think
of a complex market in terms of the parable of the blind men and the elephant.
An analyst explores all the various parts, ending up with enough pieces to
make a slow moving elephant. However, with a complex market, the feedback can
drive a change so that the next time the various parts end up making a fast
moving tiger.
Section 3
Practices
A Practice is a proposed analysis method. If permitted by market
theory, it is an approved or permitted practice, and may
safely be used in market analysis and trading. A non-permitted practice
is outside the bounds of theory and is not recommended for use in market
analysis.
PR1: An example of a Non-permitted Practice, Efficient Markets:
It has been widely
proposed that markets are efficient (any new information is immediately
reflected in the price). This practice is invalidated by theory.
Here's why: Markets are driven by feedback, therefore new information
comes in at the feedback rate. Imagine that a given trader has
new information and acts on it. That activity shows up on all trader's
screens, say as an increase in price. Some buy on the news, some sell and some
do nothing. It takes a different amount of time for each trader to decide.
After some time (typically five to thirty minutes) the new information
is assimilated and the market stops reacting to it. This shows market self
organization at work, adjusting to the new situation.
Feedback cannot take place instantly, so theory
shows that efficient market concepts are invalid in auction markets.
In plain english, even if a valid change in the value takes place instantly,
the trader
population cannot get the information, evaluate it and act on it instantly.
PR2: Congestion or Balance
The concept of congestion areas
is often used by analysts as staging points for further
movement. Is congestion a valid concept within market theory? The market
communicates via feedback. The feedback can and does report markets with
stable high - low ranges. That stability has been observed to extend from
minutes to multiple days. Congestion, or balance, is observed from feedback,
and thus balance is a permitted practice.
PR3: Value in a Balance
Define value as price over time (see Appendix 1, or ref 23, p15),
so long as price is stable. Since
balance is a permitted practice, value in balances follows.
PR4: Trend
A trend is a period of generally rising or falling
prices. Market feedback reflects such periods and so, trend is accepted,
a permitted practice.
PR5: Value in a Trend
In PR3 value is defined in a balance. In a trend,
price is moving at an uncertain rate and direction in the
very short time frame. Although changing price and varying timeframes
are observables from the market feedback, that variation
makes the definition of value uncertain in it's practice. Value is a
macroscopic variable while market behavior parameters in a non-stable market are
microscopic variables. Value in a trend cannot be read from feedback using
macroscopic methods.
PR6: The Market Unit
A market unit is defined as the combination of a period of balance,
followed by a period of imbalance and terminated by
the start of a new balance. The imbalance includes the transition (to trend),
the trend and the transition from trend back to balance.
Is a market unit a permitted practice
of market theory? Each part is permitted separately (balance and trend). The
two parts are combined linearly. The compound practice is permitted
because each of the parts are permitted and no manipulation is required.
A Series of Market Units
Market Units for 5 Day Balances: DJ 2005, Jan 3 to Nov 9.
Dte ER Ov F Dl Yr ULIM LLIM CLO $RNG U-OCT MID MU
050103 0 05 DJ 03 05 L 108650 107350 107500 1300 108488 108000
050104 2
050105 2
050106 2
050107 2
050110 0 05 DJ 03 05 L 106850 105850 106280 1000 106725 106350
050111 0 05 DJ 03 05 L 106800 105500 105580 1300 106638 106150
050112 0 05 DJ 03 05 S 106700 105250 106050 1450 106519 105975
050113 2 Included in balance per "1 day rule"
050114 0 05 DJ 03 05 L 106650 105050 105470 1600 106450 105850
050117 2 Included in balance per "1 day rule"
050118 0 05 DJ 03 05 S 106250 105050 106200 1200 106100 105650
050119 0 05 DJ 03 05 L 106250 105050 105290 1200 106100 105650
050120 0 05 DJ 03 05 L 106250 104650 104730 1600 106050 105450
050121 2
050124 2 11
050125 0 05 DJ 03 05 S 105450 103800 104660 1650 105244 104625
050126 0 05 DJ 03 05 S 105350 103800 104880 1550 105157 104575
050127 0 05 DJ 03 05 S 105200 103800 104680 1400 105025 104500
050128 0 05 DJ 03 05 L 105200 103800 104470 1400 105025 104500
050131 0 05 DJ 03 05 S 105200 103850 104850 1350 105032 104525
050201 0 05 DJ 03 05 S 105500 103850 105420 1650 105294 104675
050202 2
050203 2
050204 2
050207 2
050208 2
050209 2 12
050210 0 05 DJ 03 05 S 107550 106600 107460 950 107432 107075
050211 2
050214 2
050215 2
050216 2
050217 2
050218 0 05 DJ 03 05 S 108500 107400 107970 1100 108363 107950
050221 2
050222 2
050223 2
050224 2
050225 2
050228 2
050301 0 05 DJ 03 05 S 108450 106300 108270 2150 108182 107375
050302 0 05 DJ 03 05 S 108650 107150 108120 1500 108463 107900
050303 0 05 DJ 03 05 S 108700 107450 108260 1250 108544 108075
050304 0 05 DJ 03 05 S 109600 107500 109560 2100 109338 108550
050307 0 05 DJ 03 05 S 109800 107800 109380 2000 109550 108800
050308 0 05 DJ 03 05 S 109800 107800 109170 2000 109550 108800
050309 0 05 DJ 03 05 L 109800 108000 108020 1800 109575 108900
050310 0 05 DJ 03 05 L 109800 107900 108440 1900 109563 108850
Rollover: March to June
050311 0 05 DJ 06 05 L 110050 108050 108130 2000 109800 109050
050314 0 05 DJ 06 05 L 109700 107900 108400 1800 109475 108800
050315 2
050316 2
050317 2
050318 2
050321 2
050322 2
050323 2
050324 2
050328 2 19
050329 0 05 DJ 06 05 L 105450 104250 104370 1200 105300 104850
050330 2 Included in balance per "1 day rule"
050331 0 05 DJ 06 05 S 105550 104250 105200 1300 105388 104900
050401 0 05 DJ 06 05 L 105750 104000 104310 1750 105532 104875
050404 0 05 DJ 06 05 L 105700 103800 104400 1900 105463 104750
050405 0 05 DJ 06 05 S 105750 103800 104800 1950 105507 104775
050406 0 05 DJ 06 05 S 105750 103800 105220 1950 105507 104775
050407 0 05 DJ 06 05 S 105750 103800 105700 1950 105507 104775
050408 0 05 DJ 06 05 L 105750 103800 104750 1950 105507 104775
050411 0 05 DJ 06 05 L 105750 104450 104630 1300 105588 105100
050412 0 05 DJ 06 05 S 105750 104550 105160 1200 105600 105150
050413 0 05 DJ 06 05 L 105750 103800 104090 1950 105507 104775
050414 2
050415 2
050418 2
050419 2
050420 2 17
050421 0 05 DJ 06 05 S 102600 100250 102260 2350 102307 101425
050422 0 05 DJ 06 05 S 102200 100250 101880 1950 101957 101225
050425 0 05 DJ 06 05 S 102600 100650 102560 1950 102357 101625
050426 0 05 DJ 06 05 L 102650 100650 101610 2000 102400 101650
050427 0 05 DJ 06 05 S 102650 100800 101940 1850 102419 101725
050428 2 Included in balance per "1 day rule"
050429 0 05 DJ 06 05 S 102650 100600 101970 2050 102394 101625
050502 0 05 DJ 06 05 S 102600 100600 102550 2000 102350 101600
050503 0 05 DJ 06 05 S 102900 100600 102830 2300 102613 101750
050504 0 05 DJ 06 05 S 103750 100600 103720 3150 103357 102175
050505 0 05 DJ 06 05 S 103950 101600 103460 2350 103657 102775
050506 0 05 DJ 06 05 S 104000 102050 103370 1950 103757 103025
050509 0 05 DJ 06 05 S 104000 102150 103740 1850 103769 103075
050510 0 05 DJ 06 05 L 104000 102650 102740 1350 103832 103325
050511 0 05 DJ 06 05 L 104000 102200 103010 1800 103775 103100
050512 2
050513 2 17
050516 0 05 DJ 06 05 S 103350 101300 102520 2050 103094 102325
050517 2
050518 2
050519 2
050520 2
050523 2
050524 0 05 DJ 06 05 L 105600 104450 105010 1150 105457 105025
050525 0 05 DJ 06 05 L 105600 104350 104730 1250 105444 104975
050526 0 05 DJ 06 05 S 105600 104350 105400 1250 105444 104975
050527 0 05 DJ 06 05 S 105600 104400 105510 1200 105450 105000
050530 2 Included in balance per "1 day rule"
050531 0 05 DJ 06 05 L 105550 104400 104800 1150 105407 104975
050601 0 05 DJ 06 05 S 105900 104400 105370 1500 105713 105150
050602 0 05 DJ 06 05 S 105900 104700 105590 1200 105750 105300
050603 0 05 DJ 06 05 L 105900 104550 104810 1350 105732 105225
050606 0 05 DJ 06 05 L 105900 104450 104700 1450 105719 105175
050607 0 05 DJ 06 05 L 105900 104450 104940 1450 105719 105175
050608 0 05 DJ 06 05 L 105750 104450 104880 1300 105588 105100
050609 0 05 DJ 06 05 L 105750 104400 105010 1350 105582 105075
050610 0 05 DJ 06 05 S 105750 104400 105160 1350 105582 105075
050613 0 05 DJ 06 05 S 105850 104500 105360 1350 105682 105175
050614 0 05 DJ 06 05 S 105900 104500 105560 1400 105725 105200
Rollover: June to September
050615 0 05 DJ 09 05 S 106200 104800 106010 1400 106025 105500
050616 0 05 DJ 09 05 S 106250 104850 106050 1400 106075 105550
050617 0 05 DJ 09 05 S 106750 105150 106460 1600 106550 105950
050620 0 05 DJ 09 05 S 106750 105350 106330 1400 106575 106050
050621 0 05 DJ 09 05 S 106750 105650 106440 1100 106613 106200
050622 0 05 DJ 09 05 S 106750 105850 106330 900 106638 106300
050623 2
050624 2
050627 2
050628 2 27
050629 0 05 DJ 09 05 S 104500 102900 103830 1600 104300 103700
050630 0 05 DJ 09 05 L 104500 102900 103020 1600 104300 103700
050701 0 05 DJ 09 05 L 104450 102900 103330 1550 104257 103675
050705 0 05 DJ 09 05 S 104450 103050 103870 1400 104275 103750
050706 0 05 DJ 09 05 L 104450 102850 102880 1600 104250 103650
050707 0 05 DJ 09 05 L 104300 102600 103330 1700 104088 103450
050708 2
050711 2
050712 2
050713 2
050714 2
050715 2
050718 2
050719 2 14
050720 0 05 DJ 09 05 S 106900 105950 106830 950 106782 106425
050721 0 05 DJ 09 05 L 107100 105950 106380 1150 106957 106525
050722 0 05 DJ 09 05 S 107100 105950 106660 1150 106957 106525
050725 0 05 DJ 09 05 L 107100 106000 106290 1100 106963 106550
050726 0 05 DJ 09 05 L 107100 105900 105980 1200 106950 106500
050727 0 05 DJ 09 05 L 107100 105900 106490 1200 106950 106500
050728 0 05 DJ 09 05 S 107200 105900 107170 1300 107038 106550
050729 0 05 DJ 09 05 S 107250 105900 106770 1350 107082 106575
050801 0 05 DJ 09 05 L 107250 105900 106330 1350 107082 106575
050802 0 05 DJ 09 05 S 107250 105950 106830 1300 107088 106600
050803 0 05 DJ 09 05 S 107250 106200 107080 1050 107119 106725
050804 0 05 DJ 09 05 L 107200 106150 106150 1050 107069 106675
050805 2
050808 2 14
050809 0 05 DJ 09 05 S 106950 105350 106320 1600 106750 106150
050810 0 05 DJ 09 05 L 107200 105350 106240 1850 106969 106275
050811 0 05 DJ 09 05 S 107200 105350 106850 1850 106969 106275
050812 0 05 DJ 09 05 L 107200 105350 105980 1850 106969 106275
050815 0 05 DJ 09 05 S 107200 105700 106590 1500 107013 106450
050816 2
050817 2 7
050818 0 05 DJ 09 05 L 106650 105250 105680 1400 106475 105950
050819 0 05 DJ 09 05 L 106650 105250 105920 1400 106475 105950
050822 2 Included in balance per "1 day rule"
050823 0 05 DJ 09 05 L 106650 105200 105500 1450 106469 105925
050824 2
050825 2
050826 2
050829 2 8
050830 0 05 DJ 09 05 L 104950 103600 104150 1350 104782 104275
050831 2 Included in balance per "1 day rule"
050901 0 05 DJ 09 05 S 105050 103600 104620 1450 104869 104325
050902 0 05 DJ 09 05 S 105050 103600 104620 1450 104869 104325
050905 2
050906 2
050907 2
050908 2
050909 2
050912 2 10
050913 0 05 DJ 09 05 L 106900 105750 106170 1150 106757 106325
Rollover: September to December
050912 2
050913 0 05 SP 12 05 L 124900 123750 123890 2875 124757 124325
050914 2 Included in balance per "1 day rule"
050915 0 05 SP 12 05 L 124900 123250 123350 4125 124694 124075
050916 2 Included in balance per "1 day rule"
050919 0 05 SP 12 05 L 124450 123250 123800 3000 124300 123850
050920 2
050921 2
050922 2
050923 2 9
050926 0 05 SP 12 05 S 122950 121300 122150 4125 122744 122125
050927 0 05 SP 12 05 S 122750 121300 122170 3625 122569 122025
050928 0 05 SP 12 05 S 122750 121300 122280 3625 122569 122025
050929 2
050930 2
051003 2
051004 2
051005 2
051006 2
051007 2
051010 2 11
051011 0 05 SP 12 05 L 120600 118750 118840 4625 120369 119675
051012 2 Included in balance per "1 day rule"
051013 0 05 SP 12 05 L 120200 117300 117810 7250 119838 118750
051014 0 05 SP 12 05 S 119900 117300 118990 6500 119575 118600
051017 0 05 SP 12 05 S 119700 117300 119420 6000 119400 118500
051018 0 05 SP 12 05 L 119400 117300 118140 5250 119138 118350
051019 0 05 SP 12 05 L 119400 117300 117860 5250 119138 118350
051020 0 05 SP 12 05 L 119800 117600 117860 5500 119525 118700
051021 0 05 SP 12 05 L 119800 117600 117860 5500 119525 118700
051024 2 Included in balance per "1 day rule"
051025 0 05 SP 12 05 S 120300 117600 119890 6750 119963 118950
051026 0 05 SP 12 05 S 120500 117800 119600 6750 120163 119150
051027 0 05 SP 12 05 L 120500 118100 118250 6000 120200 119300
051028 0 05 SP 12 05 S 120500 118400 119970 5250 120238 119450
051031 0 05 SP 12 05 S 121100 118400 120980 6750 120763 119750
051101 0 05 SP 12 05 S 121100 118400 120630 6750 120763 119750
051102 2
051103 2 18
051104 0 05 SP 12 05 S 122600 120400 122200 5500 122325 121500
051107 2 Included in balance per "1 day rule"
051108 0 05 SP 12 05 S 122700 121250 122280 3625 122519 121975
051109 0 05 SP 12 05 S 122850 121750 122370 2750 122713 122300
051110 2
051111 2
051114 2 7
051115 0 05 SP 12 05 S 124000 121900 123250 5250 123738 122950
051116 0 05 SP 12 05 L 124000 123000 123470 2500 123875 123500
051117 2
Market Unit: DJ Jan - Nov 2005
In the table header Dte is trading day, ER is the state of the market,
where 0 indicates a balance, 2 is no balance; Ov is the number of days in
the Overlay, F is the commodity symbol, Dl is delivery month, Yr is the
delivery year, ULIM is the upper limit of the 5 day Overlay, LLIM is the
lower limit, CLO is the close; $RNG, U-OCT and MID are not used and
MU is the days in the completed market unit.
*The One Day Rule
A single day of balance alone is not counted as a "balance".
A single day out of balance in a run is not counted as a "breakout".
Market Unit Table, DJ 2005
Each trading day that shows a five day balance is posted
The first 11.5 months of the DJ future, 5 day Overlay, shows market units
(balance + imbalance) of lengths:
Period Days Balance Days Imbalance Net Unit Days
050110 050124 7 2 9
050125 050228 19 6 24
050301 050328 10 10 20
050329 050420 11 5 16
050421 050523 15 7 22
050329 050420 11 5 16
050524 050628 21 4 25
050629 050719 6 8 14
050720 050808 12 2 14
050809 050817 5 2 7
050818 050829 3 4 7
050830 050915 4 7 11
050916 050923 2 4 6
050926 051007 3 6 9
051011 051115 21 3 24
C4 [203MMM.UTI.SK] DJ2005_05.TXT
Discussion of DJ Market Unit Table
Section 4
Auction Market Value Analysis
It is a given of this theory that one effect of an auction market's complexity
is that market knowledge must come from empirical sources, observation of
the data, rather than
from exploration of the mathematics of a distribution function or prediction
of market variables such as interest rates. Value is a variable that can
be divined from market activity; from volume if audited data is available and
from tick data for markets for which ticks are available.
Value, read from the market activity is the second level information derived
from the primary data (time, volume, ticks, etc.).
Most of the world is complex. To arrive at useable solutions, it is required
to collect observations,
analyze the data, suggest an explanation, collect more data, refine the
explanation and so forth until there is enough information at hand to propose
a theory. This is the 'I think I understand it' point, be it in auction market
value analysis or fashion merchandising for a department store. It comes from
experience, an understanding of the field and reduction of the data.
The thrust of this work, then, is to use
market data to reach a level of understanding; re-evaluate the market data to
get to the next level, and so on, ultimately reaching the theory proposed here.
The Path of Analysis
In Auction Market Value Theory the path leads from Market Profile value
(4, 8), to the less restrictive Meta-Profile value (12, 13, 14) and then
to the Overlay Demand Curve (16, 18, 20) to find longer time frame
value and market condition. The key is value. Whenever value can be
identified, a large amount of information about the market becomes available.
The basis for auction market value analysis lies in three major
discoveries. These three take us from a
bewildering set of data generated by a complex market every minute to a
rational and reasonable explanation of how the market behaves.
The first discovery, Market Profile, found that the analytical link
data is a daily trading audit data base released by the Chicago Board of Trade.
This data base, The Liquidity Data Bank (LDB) (4, part 6), carries each
future traded at CBOT on an end-of-day report, listing each price,
the volume and times traded.
Meta-Profile identified the analytical link between market activity
(ticks) and value (12, 13, 14, 15).
Source data for Meta-Profile is a record of trades or ticks, either real time,
end-of-day or historical. In addition to value, an activity graphic similar
to that found for the Market Profile can be constructed from the tick data,
although the Meta-Profile graphic is used for somewhat different purposes.
Meta-Profile opens value
analysis to all tick producing markets, futures, forex, options, equities, etc.
Time frames for analysis can be adjusted for day markets, for night markets or
a combination as desired.
Thirdly, the Overlay Demand Curve extends Meta-Profile value analysis
to multi-day timeframes (16, 20). Longer timeframe value is found from
frequency of ticks over the extended timeframe, just as with the daily
Meta-Profile. Overlays are notable for identifying both longer term
value and market condition. Market condition identifies
those times of balance, the periods of directionality (trend) and the
transitions in between.
These three discoveries are discussed in detail in Appendix 1. They provide
the ability to decode the high density market feedback, resulting in location
of value,
of market condition and thus, the ability to track markets through their four
phases: balance, transition from balance to directionality, directionality and
the transition from directionality to balance. This information has opened
a door to further research and a deeper understanding of market structure
and behavior. Some of this work is reported in articles and books and links to
internet published literature. Some are listed in the References Section of this report
and the References page of the CISCO website (www.cisco-futures.com).
Basic Principles of Auction Market Value Theory
Applying the three major discoveries to auction market data leads to
the elements of auction markets, collected in Table 1. Data in the table,
while generally applicable to all auction markets, are
from futures markets (indexes, interest rates, forex, etc.).
The information in Table 1 is collected from experiments, data collection,
cataloging, disappointments and retries. Much of the continuing work is
reported on the References page on the CISCO website. A portion of this
work has been published in trade journals, other work is on the website,
reachable via links.
Axioms, Definitions, Observations and General Market Knowledge
1) No general market distribution function is likely to be found
2) Markets are self organizing and driven by feedback
3) Market response time to a pulse is non-zero (feedback takes time)
4) Demand is a complex function of physical and psychological factors
5) Value is a function of price over time
6) The central 70% of activity measures value (in stable markets)
7) Markets display a run, pause, run, pause price pattern
8) A trend is the 'run' portion of a run, pause price pattern
9) A balance is the 'pause' portion of a run, pause price pattern
10) Trends and balances are defined within the context of particular time frames
Table 1. Axioms, Observations and General Market Knowledge
The ten elements that are the foundation for auction market value theory.
Discussion of the Elements of Table 1
Item 1. Distribution Functions
The normal give and take of auction markets coupled with the
sometimes extreme behavior at the tails of the market (huge fast losses,
as in the October 14 - 19 1987 period),
maps out a distribution that cannot be fit by even an exponential curve.
The problem is one of risk. Much of the time most markets are trading in
a well-behaved, orderly region that possibly could be modeled by a gaussian
distribution.
But, assuming a market distribution can be misleading. A case to point
is the Black-Scholes Option Valuation procedure. Their derivation relied on the
probability density of a gaussian distribution. Subsequently, a hedge fund,
Long Term Capital Markets, employed that methology with, it is
assumed, some of their own wrinkles. Nevertheless, the methodology resulted
in the largest financial failure ever known ($1.3 trillion), as reported by
Lowenstein (5).
Long Term Capital Markets initially was quite profitable. The cause of the
failure
was market forces that hit many trading groups the same way: "There were
two reasons for the
lack of diversity of opinion in the market. The first is that virtually all
of the sophisticated models being run by the leveraged players said the same
thing......" (6). The "sophisticated models" are no doubt the
Black - Scholes
methodology modified at least for volatility and probably other parameters
as well.
Item 2. Markets are self organizing and driven by feedback
The recent thrust in economic thinking has been guided by the behavioral
economists. The shift is from general equilibrium to multiple equilibriums
and out of equilibrium, i.e. a self-organizing system. The econphysicists
arrive at the same description mathematically, emphasizing the feedback.
Item 3. Market response time to a pulse is non-zero (feedback takes time)
This point is an observable, contrary to the efficient market hypothesis.
As Steidlmayer pointed out, the market is not efficient, it is effective
(7, p14). Much earlier, Jones identified a situation where the market
acted in a predictable manner, wholly out of character for an efficient,
stochastic distribution (27).
Logically, the concept of instant feedback (efficient market) defies the
laws of nature. It takes
time for a trader to accept a price change, evaluate it, decide on a course of
action and respond. Steidlmayer explicitly selected a 30 minute feedback time,
which research has supported to some degree (24).
Item 4. Demand is a complex function of real and psychological factors
This is an assumption, supported by observation of 'herd behavior'. For an
example, see 'Day Trading the London
Blast, July 7, 8 2005' (25). It is in the 'References' list on the CISCO
homepage.
As of the July 6, 2005 close, the Dow Jones Index value range was
10402 - 10323 (CBOT
mini-sized Dow). On July 7, after the blast the market opened at 10152 and
shortly dropped to 10142. As the situation became more clear, the panic
selling began to dissipate, with the day closing at 10333. Note, closing
price is back inside the previous day (July 6) value. The next day, July 8,
the open was at 10364,
again inside the July 6 value. Price moved steadily higher, closing at 10477.
By the close, the market was decidedly directional up. The movement:
1. July 6 close Value range is 10482 - 10323
2. London subway blast occurs prior to open on July 7.
3. July 7 Open at 10152
4. July 7 Close at 10333
5. July 8 Open at 10364
6. July 8 Close at 10477
The uncertainty imposed by the blast drove market participants to cover (dumping
their longs).
The herd effect, so obvious in large market drops, e.g. the October 14 -19
1987 panic, was at work in the Dow Index market of July 7. As the news improved,
so did the market. The spectacular drop was immediately followed by a
spectacular rise.
Item 5. Value is a function of price over time
Value of the type defined by market activity is based upon the concept of
price-over-time, the relative frequency with which the market revisits a
traded price. Steidlmayer based that definition on cleared volume (4).
Later work used market activity (12), and added the caveat that the measured
market had to be in balance.
As defined by Jones (10, P2), "value is the most frequently
occurring price (region) within a period of price stability". This definition
requires a market in balance, plus it
implies sampling. The normal period is one market day, typically six or seven
trading hours, although one could use
any arbitrary period so long as consistency is maintained.
Item 6. The central 70% of market activity measures value (value area)
Steidlmayer defined the value area as +/- the first standard deviation
of a market profile which is itself defined as a gaussian curve (4); hence
the 70 percent number (actually a little less). In this work we do not posit
that a market profile forms a gaussian distribution. We do observe a clumping
of market activity in the middle of a day's price range. We accept that the
central 70% of market activity defines value. Doubtless, this working definition
might be improved by more detailed research. That is left for the graduate
student. Value can only be defined in a balanced market (see Item 9, below). A
directional market (trend, see Item 8) has changing value which is difficult,
if not impossible to measure in the general case.
Item 7. Markets display a run, pause, run, pause price pattern
Run, pause price patterns are observed. This will be demonstrated in the section
on profiles. The run, pause pattern is most likely a look into the decision
process of the collective trader, with it's uncertainties on display.
Item 8. A trend is the 'run' portion of a run, pause price pattern
Markets spend their time in either one of two states (trend (run) or
balance) or
in transition between the two states. Runs, pauses and balances will be
demonstrated in the profiles section. A run may include one or more pauses.
Item 9. A balance is related to the 'pause' portion of a run, pause price
pattern
This is the same concept as for Item 8. The pause itself demonstrates an
uncertainty within the collective. A run terminates when a pause lengthens
into a congestion. A congestion is recognized within the constraints of
the current market--it is a balance period substantially longer than the
period of the average pause (see Item 10).
Item 10. Trends and balances are defined within the context of particular
time frames
Markets display a limited fractal nature. Self similarity is seen intra-day
and day to multiple days. In the futures data we use, the self similarity
typically disappears after about 15 days. Intra-day, the fractal resemblance
may go down to
10 or so minutes. This behavior is most likely market specific so far as
the timing is concerned. It is not unusual for a market to be trending on a
3 day basis while balancing on a longer term. There are at least two scenarios:
A market may be in balance on several time scales, say 20, 14, 8 and 5 days.
A trend may begin in the shorter term period and continue to move through
longer and longer time balances, until all four timeframes are directional. Or,
secondly, the short timeframe balance is broken, the market is directional
on the short timeframe only, the trend stops and balance is restored to the
short timeframe, while the longer timeframes remain in balance through the
entire process.
Limitations
As in all empirical systems, there must be adequate observations to offer an
valid measure.
Typically, something like 100 ticks are needed for each
30 minute period to have adequate liquidity; about 1000 ticks per day is
a reasonable minimum. Less activity may still provide adequate liquidity,
requiring a judgement call on the part of the analyst.
Discussion
Table 1. is not necessarily the final word on the basics of
auction markets. The scientific, observational/empirical approach
recognizes that
there is usually more to be learned and future work can advance the state
of knowledge. Auction Market Value Theory is what it says, a theory.
As in any valid scientific theory, it is "falsifiable", meaning
it's elements can be tested and may be disproved or modified.
As with any scientific study, Table 1. is offered as "where we are now".
The nature of science is to constantly question findings and assumptions,
revising and deepening the understanding of the phenomena. Particularly,
unravelling market behavior and structure in the presence of human
psychology holds many challenges and possibilities.
Unlike other ways of analyzing markets, the empirical method may appear
somewhat lacking. Some methods try to 'know' things about the market based
on supra-market information; items like value, direction, reasons for
a change in direction and even predictors like, e.g., Elliott waves (11).
Unfortunately, the predictors tend to be of the sort "the world will end
tomorrow". Then, when tomorrow comes and there is no end, that necessitates a
recalcualtion. A case of this sort may have occurred in Elliott wave in 1987.
The huge October
1987 crash was seen as the end of a stock market cycle begun in 1932; the
peak of wave 5.
When the market quickly had a strong recovery (no, the world did not end),
waves 1 through 5 had to
be re-evaluated (26). The low on Oct. 20 (SP = 181) has been followed
by a generally rising market (by August 2005 the SP Index was above 1200).
Auction theory has the modest goal of understanding a market on the basis
of it's behavior. Since auction theory does not predict future behavior, it
is easy to question the theory's utility. One answer lies in the Practices
of Section 3. With a proper theory, one may discern which practices are
permitted by the theory and which are not. One is offered the correct path,
avoiding many meaningless or incorrect, costly detours in market analysis.
As discussed earlier, 'Know your
business' is an appropriate dictum in any business, and certainly so
for auction markets. For example, current
value offers a marker for value change. Knowing that current value is
changing offers information on directionality and what to look for, i.e.,
the onset of congestion. Compared to predicting the market several years
out, attempting to understand current value may seem mundane. Getting a
better price for one's product by understanding value is the very spirit
of markets and hardly mundane.
An old Russian proverb is apropos: There are two fools in every market:
one pays too much, the other sells too cheaply. The one who knows value
gets a fair price (or better!) and is not the fool. To a fund manager who
must rebalance a
portfolio, it would be attractive to sell the old equities near their
highest price of the recent few days and buy the new equities near their
lowest price of the same period.
A difficulty not present in the physical sciences is that
auction market data has a strong psychological component. Price varies
with the trader's perceptions. Those perceptions are reflected
in the market feedback; volume, the tick flow or other short timeframe measures.
Decoding the market activity reads the collective trader's mind. That mind
may change, often not depending on (real) value but on fear and greed. A trader
who can understand the market's feedback is in a far better position than
one who cannot (for example, see ref 25).
Another characteristic of auction markets is a time delay in a market's
response to a pulse of activity. Feedback from the widely scattered
agents/traders takes time: each trader acts within his/her own interpretation of
the market action and within his own timeframe.
In a market driven by feedback the time to respond is variable depending on
the impetus, but there is a norm, an average. A relaxation time, on average,
can be found. For markets studied to date the average relaxation time is of the
order of 30 minutes, but that obviously can change with market phase and local
conditions.
Much of market econonomics has developed from defining general truths or
'authority' and then continuing to build from there (1). It is hard to
argue with a general truth,
as the behavioral economists have found. Starting from scratch with the data,
and developing a knowledge base piece by piece has the advantage of being
testable. This, and not relying on general truths, is the scientific approach.
Auction Market Value Theory (AMVT) is a relatively new concept.
It's true utility as an economic theory is yet to be gauged. What can be said
so far is that the methodology is consistent and opens new avenues for
analyzing markets. It is helpful to practitioners by uncovering market
structure. Appendix 2 gives a sense of the wide range of subjects AMVT
can treat: the market psychology of a panic, how the market creates "units"
of balance - directional - balance, etc., an examination of waves, market
response times, efficient versus effective market activity and many others. A
wider and continually growing list can be found on the CISCO website
(www.cisco-futures.com, link to References).
References
1. Portfolio Theory & Capital Markets, W. Sharpe, McGraw Hill, 1970
2. Why Stock Markets Crash, D. Sornette, Princeton, 2005
3. Financial Market Complexity, N. Johnson, P. Jeffries, P. Hui, Oxford, 2003
4. CBOT Market Profile (J.P. Steidlmayer) CBOT internal pub. 1985, 1991
5. When Genius Failed, R. Lowenstein, Random House, 2000
6. www.erisk.com/Learning/CaseStudies/ref_case_ltcm.asp
7. Markets and Market Logic, Steidlmayer & Koy, Porcupine Press, 1986
8. Steidlmayer on Markets, Wiley 1989
9. Steidlmayer on Markets, 2nd Ed. Steidlmayer & Hawkins, Wiley 2003
10. Value Based Power Trading, Jones, Probus, 1993
Available from www.cisco-futures.com
Value Based Power Trading
11. Elliott Wave Principle, R. Prechter, A.J. Frost, NCL 1978
12. Determining the TPO Value Area, Don Jones, Market Logic School Alumni
Letter, April 13, 1987, P4
13. Estimating the Market Profile Value Area for Intraday Trading,
D.L. Jones, S&C Sep. 1987
14. Day Trading With Market Value, D.L. Jones, S&C May 2005 P16.
Related discussion at:
15. Value in Trends from Meta and Market Profiles
16. Overlay Detection of Long Term Market Condition, D.L. Jones,
The Profile Report, Vol 2, Oct. 1988
17. Intraday Trading with Tick Based Profiles, March 1990
Intra-day Trading with Tick Based Profiles
18. Overlay Detection of Long Term Market Condition, D.L. Jones,
The Profile Report, Vol 2, Oct. 1988
19. The Overlay Profile for Current Market Analysis, D.L. Jones & C.J. Young,
S&C June 1990/July 1990
20. Overlay Demand Curves, the Missing Link, D.L. Jones, Market Profile
Soc. Intl. March 1992
Overlay Demand Curve Background
21. Value Based Power Trading with the Overlay Demand Curve, D.L. Jones, Market
Profile Soc. Intl. Sep. 1992
22. Overlay Demand Curves (tm), D.L. Jones, December 19, 2004
Overlay Demand Curve Background
23. Mind Over Markets, J.F. Dalton, E. Jones, R. Dalton, Probus, 1991
Available from Amazon.com
24. Unpublished research at CISCO Futures
25. Meta-Profile/Overlay Trading the London Blast
26. http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/articles/elliottwave.html).
27. Persistence of Trends, Commodities Magazine, Feb. 1973
28. Complexity, Risk and Financial Markets, E. Peters, Wiley, 1999
Appendix 1. Discoveries
The Three Major Auction Market Discoveries
of
Auction Market Value Theory
Donald L. Jones
November 22, 2005
CISCO Futures©
Three discoveries form the foundation for practical
auction market theory and practice. These are 1) the Market Profile,
2) the Meta-Profile and
3) the Overlay Demand Curve.
The first discovery, Market Profile, found the analytical link
between volume and value, plus developing an activity graphic; by using
a daily trading audit data base released by the Chicago Board of Trade.
This data base, The Liquidity Data Bank (LDB), carried each
future traded at CBOT on an end-of-day report, listing for each price,
the volume and times traded.
Meta-Profile identified the analytical link between tick activity
and value.
Source data for Meta-Profile is a record of trades or ticks, either real time
or historical. In addition to value, an activity graphic similar to that
found for the Market Profile, can be constructed from the tick data.
Meta-Profile opens value
analysis to all tick producing markets, futures, forex, options, equities, etc.
Time frames for analysis can be adjusted for day markets, for night markets or
a combination as desired.
Thirdly, the Overlay Demand Curve extends Meta-Profile value analysis
to multi-day timeframes. Longer timeframe value is found from
frequency of ticks over the extended timeframe, just as with the daily
Meta-Profile. Overlays are notable for identifying market condition,
locating those times of balance, the periods of directionality and the
transitions in between.
The Market Profile, D1
The seeds of value theory were sown by an unlikely event in practical market
analysis. In 1985. J. Peter Steidlmayer, a well known
member of the Chicago Board of Trade, revealed that his trading basis was
value, not price (4). But his value is not the long term value sought
by the economic fundamentalists. It is value discovered from one day's trading
and changes daily in response to market forces.
Steidlmayer's value comes from calculating price-over-time.
He offered it as an algebraic formula: value = price + time.
Dimensionally, price and time are not compatible. The formula means
that acceptable (fair) prices will be traded more than unfair (too high or
too low) prices. Over a day's trading, volume at price will show which prices
are accepted by heavy trading and which are rejected by light trading.
Information from the Market
Steidlmayer observed that a price - activity chart often looked like the
well known bell curve, or a normal (gaussian) distribution. He
chose the bell curve for his model of market activity.
The CBOT Liquidity Data Bank (LDB)
Steidlmayer was instrumental in creating the Chicago Board of Trade
Liquidity Data Bank
report (4, ch 6), an end of day audit of all trading on the exchange. Every
future at the CBOT listed volume and time at each price. The LDB report
format included the bell shaped "profile" of trading. This is a graphic
showing the trading at each price, as identified by time, breaking the day
into half-hour reporting periods of exchange cleared trading.
The sample LDB report in figure 1 shows both the Market Profile graphic, the
cleared volume at price, and the value area (70% VOLUME SUMMARY). Included are
the distributed volumes generated by the four classes of CBOT members
(%VOL, %CTI1, 2, 3, 4), which are not involved in profile analysis.
The Market Profile Graphic
The bell shaped curve, the Market Profile (BRACKETS in the LDB data in figure
1), peaking
around the middle prices, could give one a sense of the center of value
(4, 7a).
This is a qualitative view, a chart of activity at price over time. However,
in the Market
Profile construct, value is centered at the peak volume price. By analogy
with the assumed bell shaped, gaussian distribution, Steidlmayer defined a
'value area' as the first standard deviation, the middle (approximately)
seventy percent of the posted volume on the CBOT LDB report (7 p90).
While a profile (graphic) is defined as the
temporal distribution of trading activity, located by cleared
price at time, the value area is
defined by cleared volume. The intermingling of these two concepts has
caused confusion. Observationally, it is often true that the center of
volume based value is near the center of trading activity (see figure 1,
below). The general agreement between center of value and the peak of the
Market Profile can fail in
markets that are moving from balance to directionality or vice versa (11a).
CBOT VOLUME REPORT
TRADING DATE: 11 28 00
CONTRACT: DEC 00 DJIA (CBOT) DAY
PRICE VOLUME %VOL %CTI1 %CTI2 %CTI3 %CTI4 BRACKETS(*)
10655 4 0.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 C
10650 68 0.2 51.5 0.0 0.0 47.1 C
10645 112 0.4 75.9 0.0 8.9 14.3 C
10640 140 0.5 61.4 6.4 0.0 29.3 C
10635 144 0.5 63.2 0.0 2.8 33.3 C
10630 292 1.0 55.5 0.0 0.0 43.5 C
10625 306 1.1 70.9 0.0 1.0 27.5 C
10620 734 2.6 56.4 2.2 2.6 38.3 C
10615 520 1.8 61.3 1.2 0.8 36.3 BCDJK
10610 1104 3.9 55.3 7.1 1.5 35.9 BCDEHIJK
10605 1396 4.9 53.9 10.5 3.1 32.2 BCDEHIJKL
10600 1384 4.9 47.0 12.5 2.2 38.2 BCDEHIJKL
10595 1234 4.3 62.7 1.4 2.4 33.5 BCDEHIJKL
10590 1572 5.5 55.5 4.3 2.8 37.3 BDEHIJKL
10585 1256 4.4 60.4 2.1 3.4 33.8 BDEGHIJKL
10580 1084 3.8 60.9 1.8 3.1 34.0 BDEGHIJKL
10575 786 2.8 51.8 5.1 2.4 40.5 BDEGHIJKLM
10570 898 3.2 64.7 3.8 1.7 29.6 ABEGHKLM
10565 1248 4.4 54.9 0.2 3.1 41.7 ZABEFGHLM
10560 1214 4.3 58.6 1.1 2.6 37.6 ZABEFGHM
10555 2076 7.3 49.0 3.9 1.2 45.9 Z$ABEFGMNO
10550 2075 7.3 53.2 3.2 1.6 41.9 Z$ABEFGMNO
10545 1528 5.4 49.0 5.0 2.7 43.3 Z$BEFMNO
10540 1942 6.8 52.2 1.1 2.8 43.9 $BEFMNO
10535 1468 5.2 46.5 2.8 1.6 49.0 BEFMNO
10530 962 3.4 45.9 5.8 3.0 44.8 BMNO
10525 266 0.9 52.3 0.0 2.3 44.7 NO
10520 166 0.6 38.0 0.0 1.2 59.6 NO
10515 152 0.5 23.7 11.2 5.3 59.9 O
70% VOLUME SUMMARY
10605 20798 70.3 53.1 3.2 2.5 41.2 Z$ABCDEFGHIJKLMNO
10535
Copyright Board of Trade of the City of Chicago 1993. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
Market Profile is a Registered trademark of the CBOT.
Some prices are omitted to condense the display.
Figure 1. Liquidity Data Bank (LDB) Report for CBOT Dow Index, Nov 28, 2000.
COMMODITY -- DJIA (CBOT) DAY JUN 04 April 1, 2004
Price Brackets
103950 D | Upper Tail
103900 DE |
103850 DE | Upper Range
103800 DE | Extension
103750 DEFK |
103700 DFJKLP |
103650 CGJKLP |
103600 CGHJKLMP |
103550 zCHIKLMNP | |
103500 zCHILMNP | Value Area | Initial
103450 zACHIMN | 70% of Trade | Balance (first two periods)
103400 zABCHMN | |
103350 yzABCMN | |
103300 ABCN |
103250 BC | Lower Range
103200 BC | Extension
Some prices are omitted to condense the display.
Figure 2. Profile Structure.
The Tick-TPO or Meta-Profile, D2
Requiring audited (cleared) data for Market Profile methodology
excluded most of the auction market world. This problem was solved in 1987
when the Tick-TPO Profile was announced (12, 13). Tick-TPO Profile,
later called
Meta-Profile, is a methodology that generates the profile graphic and
value area from tick data, either within a day or at end-of-day.
The Meta-Profile Market Graphic
Meta-Profiles generated by ticks create both a profile
graphic and a value area. Profile graphics from the LDB audit data
and from ticks are usually quite similar and often give virtually identical
profile charts. Value
area, too, is quite close between the two methods, except in directional
markets (15). Unlike the Market Profile, Meta-Profile construction and
analysis does not rely in any way on the tick data having a gaussian
distribution. Other features of Market Profile analysis, such as day types
and reliance on the gaussian distribution of the profile graphic are not used
in Meta-Profile
based analyses. Meta-Profile value comes from TPO counts, with no reference
to the shape of the Market Profile type graphic. TPO counts play the same
role for Meta-Profile value that volume does for the Market Profile value
area.
A Tick - TPO Profile With Half-Hour Timeframes
A Meta-Profile representation of the data for the Dow Index of figure 1
is in figure 3. Price bar is on the
left, then the TPO count (#), next are the Profile TPOs, followed by all
the half-hour vertical bars,
stated in TPOs. Value at any point in time (indicated by the
TPO half-hour bar columns dashed lines) is the middle seventy percent of the
TPO counts up to that time.
The vertical bars on the TPO columns, the value area to that point, change
as value changes throughout the day.
For instance, at the end of 'A' period there is one TPO at 105700, two at 105650,
two at 105600, three at 105550, three at 105500, two at 105450 and one at
105400. The center is at 105550, indicated by the arrow '>', and the value
area is 105600 to 105450 (the vertical bars).
At end of day, the
value area lies between 106100 and 105530. The center
of trading for the day is at 105750, with 9 TPOs (BDEGHIJKL). By comparison,
the Liquidity Data Bank of figure 1 reports a value area of 105980 to 105330,
with the
peak volume of 2076 at 105550. There is good agreement between the two,
considering that two different data sets are used and there is rounding from
the large price compression.
Meta-PROFILE* REPORT FOR 11 28 00
COMMODITY -- DJIA (CBOT) DAY DEC 00
Price # Brackets Segmented Auction
106550 1 C C
106500 1 C C
106450 1 C C
106400 1 C C
106350 1 C C
106300 1 C C
106250 1 C C
106200 1 C C
106150 5 BCDJK B C D J K
106100 8 BCDEHIJK B C D E H I |J |K | | | |
106050 9 BCDEHIJKL B C D E H I |J |K |L | | |
106000 9 BCDEHIJKL B C |D E H I |J |K |L | | |
105950 9 BCDEHIJKL B |C |D |E | |H |I |J |K |L | | |
105900 8 BDEHIJKL B | |D |E | | |H |I |J |K |L | | |
105850 9 BDEGHIJKL B | |D |E | |G |H |I |J |K |L | | |
105800 9 BDEGHIJKL B | |D |E | |G |H |I |J |K |L | | |
105750 10 BDEGHIJKLM |B | |D |E | |G |H |I |J |K |L >M > >
105700 8 ABEGHKLM A |B | | |E | |G |H | | |K |L |M | |
105650 9 yABEFGHLM y A |B | | |E |F |G >H > | | |L |M | |
105600 8 yABEFGHM |y |A |B | | |E |F |G |H | | | |M | |
105550 10 yzABEFGMNP >y |z >A >B > > >E >F >G | | M |N |P
105500 10 yzABEFGMNP |y |z |A |B | | |E |F |G | | M N P
105450 8 yzBEFMNP y |z | |B | | |E |F | | | M N P
105400 7 zBEFMNP z |B | | |E |F | | M N P
105350 6 BEFMNP |B | E |F | M N P
105300 4 BMNP B | M N P
105250 2 NP N P
105200 2 NP N P
105150 1 P P
TPO Analysis
CENTER 105750
VALUE AREA FROM TPOS
UPPER 106100
LOWER 105530
Figure 3. Meta-Profile for DJ Index, November 28, 2000
Source data is ticks.
Meta-Profile is copyright of CISCO, 1987, 1990
Some prices are omitted to condense the display.
The CISCO five day Meta-Profile* display
DJIA (CBOT) DAY DEC 00 First date: 10 31 0 Last date: 11 6 0
31 1 2 3 6
110800 N
110700 LN
110600 HKLN
110500 LM FHIKLN
110400 KLM ABC EFGHIJKLN
110300 KLMN ABC EFGHIJKLMN
110200 IJKLMN ABC DEGIJKLMN
110100 IJKLN ABCD zB CDEJMN
110000 IJK ABCD yzB CDEM
109900 HIJ yzABCDEFN yzABGK CEM
109800 HI yzACDEFGHN yABCFGHK y C
109700 H yDEFGHKMN ABCDFGHJKLM y C
109600 GH DEFGHIKMN ACDEFGHIJKLMN yz BC
109500 AG GHIJKM ACDEFHIJKLMN yz BC
109400 AEFG IJKLM DEFILN yzA BC
109300 yzABEFG IJLM LN yA B
109200 yzABEFG JLM N ACD B
109100 yABCDE L ABCD AB
109000 yABCDE L ABCDMN yzAB
108900 BCD ABDEMN yzAB
108800 BCD ABDEMN AB
108700 BC ABEFIMN A
108600 B EFILM
108500 EGHIJKL
108400 EGHIJKL
108300 GHJKL
108200 GK
Figure 4. Five days of the DJ Index in a bounded, balanced market.
Five day Range 110800 to 108200 is $2,600.
*Meta-Profile is copyright CISCO 1987, 1990
Some prices are omitted to condense the display.
The CISCO five day Meta-Profile* display
DJIA (CBOT) DAY DEC 00 First date: 11 7 0 Last date: 11 13 0
7 8 9 10 13
110700 yz
110600 yzAE
110500 yzABFG zAEF
110400 yzABFGHIJN zABEFGHI
110300 yABEFGHIJKN zABEGHIJK
110200 ABDEFGHIJKN BCDEGHIJKL
110100 BCDEFJKLMN BCDEIJKLMN
110000 BCDEKLM BCDIJKLMN
109900 CDLM BCIKMN
109800 C BCIMN
109700 BMN
109600 BN
109500 N
109400 N yC
109300 N yCM
109200 N yCDMN
109100 yCDEFMN
109000 yBCDEFLMN
108900 yzBCDEFLMN
108800 yzABCDEFGKLMN
108700 yzABCGKLMN
108600 ABCGKLMN
108500 ABCGHKLMN
108400 AGHKLMN
108300 AGHKLM
108200 AHIKL
108100 AHIK ACD
108000 AIK yzACD
107900 AIK yzABCD
107800 IJK yzABCDE
107700 IJK yzABCDE
107600 IJK yABCDEG
107500 IJK ABCEFGHI
107400 IJ BCEFGHIJ
107300 IJ BCEFGHIJLM
107200 IJ BFGHIJKLM
107100 IJ GHJKLM
107000 IJ GJKLMN
106900 IJ JKLMN
106800 IJ JKN
106700 IJ JKN
106600 J KN
106500 J N
106400 N LM
106300 LM
106200 LM
106100 BLM
106000 BKLMN
105900 BKLMN
105800 BCKLMN
105700 BCKLMN
105600 ABCKLN
105500 ABCJKN
105400 yzABCIJK
105300 yzABCDIJK
105200 yzABCDIJK
105100 zABDIJK
105000 zABDEIJ
104900 ADEHIJ
104800 DEHI
104700 DEFGHI
104600 EFGH
104500 EFGH
104400 EFGH
104300 FGH
104200 FGH
104100 H
Figure 5. Five days of the DJ Index in a directional (down) market.
Four day range (Nov 8 - 13) is 110700 to 104100 or $6,600.
*Meta-Profile is copyright CISCO 1987, 1990
Some prices are omitted to condense the display.
The Overlay Demand Curve, D3
Multi-Day Value in Auction Markets, the Overlay Demand Curve Graphic
From the inception of Market Profile the emphasis has been on intra-day trading.
Steidlmayer was a floor trader (local) who developed the Market Profile for a
time horizon mostly limited to the current day, based on value location
from the previous trading day.
While profiles reliably find day value in balanced markets,
even in such balanced markets day-to-day profile
value may fluctuate substantially.
The Overlay Demand Curve (18, 19, 20) was developed to extend the one-day range of the Meta-Profile
to longer time-frames. An Overlay is a linear aggregation of profiles.
Whereas the profile finds one day value (value area), the Overlay locates
value for the time period desired (days or parts of days). Overlay's are
especially valuable in
identifying balanced markets. They show upper and lower limits (support
and resistance), estimate risk and provide a distribution that can be
analyzed (the shape can show how demand comes into the market).
Markets are known to be not serially correlated on a day-to-day basis (see
ref8, pg 21 for an example). Simply comparing one day's profile to the
next offers no firm ground for analysis if the market condition has changed.
The goal is to find market condition, where the market is in it's evolution
from balance to trend. Markets go through a four step process (9), which
can start with balance and end back at balance.
A balance will move into the trend phase over a period of time, a part of a
day or more. A trend's end and the beginning of a new balance also traverses
a transition period governed solely by the behavior of market participants.
An orderly four step progression often occurs, but it is not
a path the market always takes. There may be a break out from a balance that
is quickly followed by a return to balance (false breakout). Or a trend may
pause and retrace before continuing on. Any of the four steps may happen in a
time as short as minutes or as long as days.
A Balanced Overlay Demand Curve
A way to examine time frames longer than a day is to linearly combine the
requisite number of Meta-Profiles, forming an Overlay Demand Curve (16). The
composite telescopes temporal differences into a master, multi-day time
frame. As an example, the five days of Meta-Profiles in figure 4 are combined
into the Overlay Demand Curve of figure 6.
Overlay Demand Curve*
DJIA (CBOT) DAY DEC 00 First date: 10 31 0 Last date: 11 6 0
VOL DETAIL TK VOL HITS TIME: 1=NEAR, 2=NEXT BACK,...
110800 9 1 1
110700 20 2 11
110600 53 4 1111
110500 155 8 11111155
110400 274 15 111111111444555
110300 401 17 11111111114445555
110200 299 18 111111111444555555
110100 412 17 11111133444455555
110000 317 14 11113334444555
109900 223 21 111333333444444444555
109800 372 22 1233333333444444444455
109700 472 23 12333333333334444444445
109600 385 28 1122333333333333344444444455
109500 381 24 112233333333333344444455
109400 299 20 11222333333444445555
109300 340 16 1223344445555555
109200 263 15 122234445555555
109100 228 13 1122224555555
109000 296 17 11112222224555555
108900 255 13 1111222222555
108800 213 11 11222222555
108700 127 10 1222222255
108600 77 6 222225
108500 117 7 2222222
108400 95 7 2222222
108300 71 5 22222
108200 22 2 22
Figure 6. Overlay Demand Curve of DJ Index, Dec 00, for 5 Days
Data is for Oct 31, (5), Nov 1 (4), Nov 2 (3), Nov 3 (2) and Nov 6 (1).
Column 1 is price, column 2 is tick count, column 3 is the number of
occurrences (TPO's) at each price and column 4 is the days for the TPO's.
For instance, the price 110000 experienced 14 hits (TPO's) of which 4
came on day 1 (Nov 6), 3 hits came on day 3 (Nov 2), 4 hits on day 4 (Nov 1) and
3 hits on day 5 (Oct 31).
Overlay Demand Curve is a trademark of CISCO Futures 1987.
Some prices are omitted to condense the display.
Recognizing Market Condition in a Balance
Overlay Demand Curve
DJIA (CBOT) DAY DEC 00 First date: 11 7 0 Last date: 11 13 0
VOL DETAIL VOL HITS 1=NEAR, 2=NEXT BK,...
110700 28 2 44
110600 24 4 4444
110500 131 10 4444555555
110400 265 18 444444445555555555
110300 263 20 44444444455555555555
110200 285 21 444444444455555555555
110100 345 20 44444444445555555555
110000 322 16 4444444445555555
109900 214 10 4444445555
109800 82 6 444445
109700 26 3 444
109600 10 2 44
109500 20 1 4
109400 54 3 334
109300 54 4 3334
109200 54 6 333334
109100 90 7 3333333
109000 155 9 333333333
108900 158 10 3333333333
108800 183 13 3333333333333
108700 148 10 3333333333
108600 122 8 33333333
108500 108 9 333333333
108400 92 7 3333333
108300 71 6 333333
108200 86 5 33333
108100 113 7 2223333
108000 133 8 22222333
107900 143 9 222222333
107800 168 10 2222222333
107700 164 10 2222222333
107600 160 10 2222222333
107500 113 11 22222222333
107400 137 10 2222222233
107300 189 12 222222222233
107200 161 11 22222222233
107100 109 8 22222233
107000 114 8 22222233
106900 90 7 2222233
106800 93 5 22233
106700 54 5 22233
106600 28 3 223
106500 32 2 23
106400 52 3 112
106300 15 2 11
106200 8 2 11
106100 13 3 111
106000 37 5 11111
105900 60 5 11111
105800 55 6 111111
105700 49 6 111111
105600 64 6 111111
105500 41 6 111111
105400 73 8 11111111
105300 106 9 111111111
105200 56 9 111111111
105100 78 7 1111111
105000 60 7 1111111
104900 45 6 111111
104800 44 4 1111
104700 12 6 111111
104600 37 4 1111
104500 53 4 1111
104400 34 4 1111
104300 48 3 111
104200 19 3 111
104100 1 1 1
Figure 7. Overlay Demand Curve of DJ Index, Dec 00, for 5 Days
Data is for Nov 7, (5), Nov 8 (4), Nov 9 (3), Nov 10 (2) and Nov 13 (1).
Column 1 is price, column 2 is tick count, column 3 is the number of
occurrences (TPO's) at each price and column 4 is the days for the TPO's.
For instance, the price 109000 experienced 9 hits (TPO's) of which all
came on day 3 (Nov 9).
Overlay Demand Curve is a trademark of CISCO Futures 1987.
Some prices are omitted to condense the display.
Recognizing Market Condition in a Directional (Trending) Market
A Balance: 3 DAY OVERLAY META-PROFILE OVERLAY* DEC 00 DJIA (CBOT) DAY 11 06 00 TO 11 08 00 PRICE DYS L/F ROT PROFILE * TPOS TPO VOL OVERLAY * 110800 1 6 6 1 X 110700 2 68 68 4 XXXX <== Upper Limit 110600 2 68 68 5 XXXXX 110500 3 68 678 14 XXXXXXXXXXXXXX 110400 3 68 678 21 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 110300 3 68 678 27 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 110200 3 68 678 29 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 110100 3 68 678 23 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 110000 3 68 678 20 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 109900 3 68 678 13 XXXXXXXXXXXXX 109800 3 68 678 7 XXXXXXX 109700 2 68 68 4 XXXX 109600 2 68 68 3 XXX 109500 2 68 68 3 XXX 109400 2 68 68 3 XXX <== Lower Limit and Close Nov 8 109300 2 68 68 2 XX 109200 2 68 68 2 XX 109100 1 6 6 1 X 109000 1 6 6 3 XXX 108900 1 6 6 4 XXXX 108800 1 6 6 2 XX 108700 1 6 6 1 X Figure 8. Three day Overlay for DJ Index, Nov 6, 7, 8. This figure is similar to figures 6 and 7, with 'TPO VOL OVERLAY' replacing the column '1=NEAR, 2=NEXT BK,...' and 'ROT PROFILE' indicating days (6 = Nov 6, 7 = Nov 7 and 8 = Nov 8). This three day Overlay uses some of the same data as found in Figures 4 - 7. Shown is a three day balance (single distribution). Overlay Demand Curve is a trademark of CISCO Futures 1987. Some prices are omitted to condense the display.The market of Nov 9 opens at 109450, within the previous three day balance. This is the high of the day. Price quickly falls below 109400. This is an alert for a downside breakout. A four day Overlay, Nov 6 through 9 is shown in figure 9.
Breakout from a 3 Day Balance: META-PROFILE OVERLAY* DEC 00 DJIA (CBOT) DAY 11 06 00 TO 11 09 00 PRICE DYS L/F ROT PROFILE * TPOS TPO VOL OVERLAY * 110800 1 6 6 1 X 110700 2 6 68 4 XXXX 110600 2 6 68 5 XXXXX 110500 3 6 678 14 XXXXXXXXXXXXXX 110400 3 6 678 21 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 110300 3 6 678 27 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 110200 3 6 678 29 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 110100 3 6 678 23 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 110000 3 6 678 20 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 109900 3 6 678 13 XXXXXXXXXXXXX 109800 3 6 678 7 XXXXXXX 109700 2 6 68 4 XXXX 109600 2 6 68 3 XXX 109500 2 6 68 3 XXX 109400 3 69 689 5 XXXXX <== Lower Balance Limit for Nov 8 109300 3 69 689 5 XXXXX Breakout within 10 minutes of open 109200 3 69 689 5 XXXXX 109100 2 69 69 7 XXXXXXX 109000 2 69 69 11 XXXXXXXXXXX 108900 2 69 69 14 XXXXXXXXXXXXXX 108800 2 69 69 12 XXXXXXXXXXXX 108700 2 69 69 11 XXXXXXXXXXX 108600 1 9 9 8 XXXXXXXX <== Close Nov 9 108500 1 9 9 9 XXXXXXXXX 108400 1 9 9 7 XXXXXXX 108300 1 9 9 6 XXXXXX 108200 1 9 9 4 XXXX 108100 1 9 9 4 XXXX 108000 1 9 9 3 XXX 107900 1 9 9 3 XXX 107800 1 9 9 2 XX 107700 1 9 9 3 XXX 107600 1 9 9 3 XXX 107500 1 9 9 3 XXX 107400 1 9 9 2 XX 107300 1 9 9 2 XX 107200 1 9 9 2 XX 107100 1 9 9 2 XX 107000 1 9 9 2 XX 106900 1 9 9 2 XX 106800 1 9 9 2 XX 106700 1 9 9 2 XX 106600 1 9 9 1 X 106500 1 9 9 1 X Figure 9. Four day Overlay for DJ Index, Nov 6, 7, 8, 9. 'ROT PROFILE' indicates days (6 = Nov 6, 7 = Nov 7, 8 = Nov 8 and 9 = Nov 9). This three day Overlay uses some of the same data as found in Figures 4 - 7. The three day balance (single distribution) of figure 8 is augmented with the data of Nov 9, illustrating a breakout. The single distribution of figure 8 is centered at 110200. That distribution still shows, but another has been added, centered at 108900. The breakout below 109400 gave an alert that the market was transitioning from balance to directional. The formation of the second, lower distribution confirmed the change in market condition. Overlay Demand Curve is a trademark of CISCO Futures 1987. Some prices are omitted to condense the display.Analysis of the Breakout Day, Nov 9
META-PROFILE OVERLAY DEC 00 DJIA (CBOT) DAY 11 13 00 TO 11 16 00 PRICE DYS L/F ROT PROFILE * TPOS TPO VOL OVERLAY * 108500 1 7 1 X 108400 1 7 1 X 108300 1 7 4 XXXX <== Upper Limit 108200 1 7 5 XXXXX 108100 2 67 5 XXXXX 108000 3 8 678 7 XXXXXXX 107900 3 8 678 8 XXXXXXXX 107800 3 8 678 9 XXXXXXXXX 107700 3 8 678 14 XXXXXXXXXXXXXX 107600 3 8 678 17 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 107500 3 8 678 15 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 107400 3 8 678 18 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 107300 3 8 678 23 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 107200 3 8 678 25 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 107100 3 8 678 20 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 107000 3 8 678 16 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 106900 3 8 678 15 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 106800 3 8 678 12 XXXXXXXXXXXX 106700 2 8 68 9 XXXXXXXXX 106600 1 6 7 XXXXXXX 106500 1 6 5 XXXXX <== Lower Limit (est) 106400 2 5 56 6 XXXXXX 106300 2 5 56 5 XXXXX 106200 2 5 56 5 XXXXX 106100 2 5 56 5 XXXXX 106000 1 5 5 4 XXXX 105900 1 5 5 5 XXXXX 105800 1 5 5 6 XXXXXX 105700 1 5 5 6 XXXXXX 105600 1 5 5 5 XXXXX 105500 1 5 5 5 XXXXX 105400 1 5 5 7 XXXXXXX 105300 1 5 5 8 XXXXXXXX 105200 1 5 5 9 XXXXXXXXX 105100 1 5 5 7 XXXXXXX 105000 1 5 5 6 XXXXXX 104900 1 5 5 5 XXXXX 104800 1 5 5 4 XXXX 104700 1 5 5 4 XXXX 104600 1 5 5 4 XXXX 104500 1 5 5 4 XXXX 104400 1 5 5 4 XXXX 104300 1 5 5 3 XXX 104200 1 5 5 3 XXX 104100 1 5 5 1 X Figure 10. Four day Overlay for DJ Index, Nov 13 , 14, 15, 16. Overlay Demand Curve is a trademark of CISCO Futures 1987. Some prices are omitted to condense the display.The Overlay Demand Curve is the third discovery establishing auction market value theory as a viable discipline. It is now possible to find value in the short time frame of a day or less and longer time frames of many days. An Overlay's ability to find market condition permits a deeper understanding of the structure of markets, such as the typical number of days in balances and the typical number in trends. A side benefit is that it is now often possible to evaluate methodologies used in trading, throwing light on practical questions such as the general viability of some well known trading methods.
Appendix 2. Practices
Psychology is an agreed effect in markets, but one that is hard to measure.
The recent tech bubble was identified many times and by many people. Still,
it's end was a surprise. The end of a long time-frame market effect can
probably not be predicted with any accuracy. However, on a day-to-day basis
value theory can be a useful guide. An example is the short time large
psychological market effect of the London Subway bombing.
Meta-Profile/Overlay Trading the London Blast
The Market Unit is a construct of auction theory. It separates the balances
from the trends. The combination of a balance period
followed by a directional phase defines a unit. Market Unit is a fundamental
market element.
The Market Unit
A large effort is spent on 'technical', or numeric market analysis.
A substantial part of this effort is on cycles. The question is, does the market
data support these efforts; is the data conditioned for the task. If a market
has no 14 day cycle, a smoothing 14 day moving average is smoothing noise.
Market Waves and Tech Anal
Large returns ()both negative and positive) are not rare. This was the
clue that led the econophysicists
to suspect the application of the gaussian distribution in CAPM. Large returns
can be demonstrated with ordinary, everyday data.
CISCO internal report
'Noise traders' is the name economists give to speculators. The inference
is that the other class 'insiders' know what they are doing (are profitable
traders). The performance of mutual funds belies the definition.
From Noise Trader to Insider
Market response time is a normal adjunct of market feedback. But what is
that time? Value theory analyses imply the time is variable with market
condition, but an average of about 30 minutes is found.
CISCO internal report
Multiple trading opportunities within a day are desired by all traders.
Meta-Profile identifies them. Such opportunities can be qualified by
the Overlay Demand Curve market condition.
Markets do NOT Turn on a Dime
Trading models are desired by most short timeframe (day) traders. A value
theory methodology finds 'market' opportunity from basic principles. But,
a trading model is incomplete without 'trader strategy', unique to each
trader.
Developing a Trading Model
Market efficiency suggests markets process all new information instantly
and hence, markets cannot be successfully traded.
A test is the probablility of a new high following today's contract high.
The chance of yet another higher high following today's new high within
the next ten days is 80 percent; 60 percent for two higher highs and
50 percent for three higher highs.
Ref: Persistence of trends: Commodities Mag. Feb 1973
Markets do NOT Turn on a Dime
Another test of market efficiency examines the day to day price correlation
within a trend. In the trend